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Forcing in the alternative set theory I
Jiř́ı Sgall
Abstract. The technique of forcing is developed for the alternative set theory (AST) and
similar weak theories, where it can be used to prove some new independence results. There
are also introduced some new extensions of AST.
Keywords: alternative set theory, forcing, generic extension, symmetric extension, axiom
of constructibility
Classification: Primary 03E70; Secondary 03E25, 03E35, 03E45
We develop the method of forcing in the alternative set theory (AST) and similar
weak theories like the second order arithmetic to settle some questions on indepen-
dence of some axioms not included in AST.
The material is divided into two parts. In this paper, the technique is developed
and in its continuation (A. Sochor and J. Sgall: Forcing in the AST II, to appear in
CMUC) concrete results will be proved. Most of them concern some forms of the
axiom of choice not included in the basic axiomatics of AST. The main results are:
(1) The axiom of constructibility is independent of AST plus the strong scheme
of choice plus the scheme of dependent choices.
(2) The scheme of choice is independent of A2 (the second order arithmetic).
This is already known, but our proof works in A3, while the old one uses
cardinals up to ℵω, which needs much stronger theory.
(3) The scheme of choice is independent of AST.
Let us sketch the main points different from the technique of forcing in the
classical set theory:
We construct generic extensions such that sets are absolute (i.e. we add only
classes). This saves many technical problems, as we have no troubles with sets like
{G}, whereG is a generic object. On the other side, we have only small cardinalities,
so we must avoid such techniques as embedding orderings into complete boolean
algebra or using groups of automorphisms. Another interesting difference is that
there can be some new types of well-orderings in the extension, while in ZF, the
class of ordinal numbers is preserved.
In the first section, we repeat briefly the axiomatization of AST and some basic
facts. The second section gives basic notions and results concerning the syntactical
aspects of forcing and the third section covers its model-theoretical aspects. In the
last section, a special sort of symmetric extensions is studied.
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1. The alternative set theory.
By AST, we mean the axiomatization of the alternative set theory as is formalized
in [S 1979]. We list the axioms here, their discussion can be found in [S 1979] and [V].
There are two kinds of objects—classes and sets. From the formal viewpoint,
Set (X) is a contraction for (∃Y ) (X ∈ Y ), small letters denote variables rang-
ing over sets. A formula is called normal if there are only quantifiers with vari-
ables for sets. We suppose that our language is formalized with the basic symbols
=,∈,¬,&, (∀x), (∀X). By TC (theory of classes), we denote the theory (A1) +
(A2) + (A3).
Axioms of the AST:
(A1) Axiom of extensionality. (∀X,Y )(X = Y ⇔ (∀Z)(Z ∈ X ⇔ Z ∈ Y ))
(A2) Scheme of existence of classes (Morse’s scheme).
Let a formula Φ be given. Then
(∀X1, . . . , Xm)(∃Y )(∀x)(x ∈ Y ⇔ Φ(x,X1, . . . , Xm)).
This axiom enables us to define usual operations with classes, the universal class V ,
the class of natural numbers N , the class of finite natural numbers FN = {α ∈
N ; (∀X ⊆ α) Set (X)}, the language of finite formulas FL, relation of satisfaction
 of formulas of FL in V , etc.
We(R) denotes that R is a well-ordering, We(A,R) means We(R)& dom (R)





4 R) denotes that Q is a well-ordering of a smaller (resp. smaller or equal) type
than R. The ordering is of the type Ω if it is an uncountable well-ordering of the
smallest type, the class Ω is a fixed subclass of N such that 〈Ω,≤〉 is an ordering of
the type Ω. The symbol XX denotes the characteristic function of X , i.e. the class
({1} ×X) ∪ ({0} × (V \X)).
(A3) Axiom of existence of sets. Set (∅)& (∀x, y) Set (x ∪ {y})
(A4) Axiom of induction for sets.
(∀ϕ ∈ FL)(V |= (ϕ(∅)& (∀x, y)(ϕ(x)⇒ ϕ(x ∪ {y})))⇒ (∀x)ϕ(x)).
For us it is important that this axiom can be written in the form (∃X)Φ(X), where
Φ is a normal formula (see [S 1979]).
(A5) Prolongation axiom.
(∀F )((Fnc(F )& dom(F ) = FN)⇒ (∃ f)(Fnc(f)&F ⊆ f)).
(A6) Axiom of choice. (∃R)We(V,R)
(A7) Axiom of cardinalities. (∀X)(X 4 FN∨X ≈ V )
(A8) Scheme of regularity.
Let ϕ be a set-theoretical formula. Then
(∃x)ϕ(x)⇒ (∃x)(ϕ(x)& (∀ y ∈ x)¬ϕ(y)).
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System of classes in the theory TC means a system given by a formula with
class parameters, i.e. a system of the form {X ;ϕ(X,X1, . . . , Xk)}. A system A is
codable if there exists a class S such that A = {S′′{x};x ∈ V }.
We will refer also to some schemes and axioms not included into the axiomati-
zation of the AST.:
(ADC) Axiom of dependent choices.
(∀X)((∀x)(∃ y)(〈x, y〉 ∈ X)⇒
⇒ (∀x)(∃F )(dom (F ) = FN &F (0) = x&(∀n)(〈F (n), F (n+ 1)〉 ∈ X))).
This is a weaker form of the axiom of choice, but it will be sufficient in some proofs.
(SC) Scheme of choice (weak). Let a formula Φ be given. Then
(∀n)(∃X)Φ(n,X)⇒ (∃Y )(∀n)Φ(n, Y ′′{n}).
(SSC) Strong scheme of choice. Let a formula Φ be given. Then
(∀x)(∃X)Φ(x,X)⇒ (∃Y )(∀x)Φ(x, Y ′′{x}).
(SDC) Scheme of dependent choices. Let Φ be a formula such that (∀X)(∃Y )
Φ(X,Y ). Then
(∀X)(∃Y )(dom (Y ) ⊆ FN &Y ′′{0} = X &(∀n ∈ FN)Φ(Y ′′{n}, Y ′′{n+ 1})).
(Q) Axiom of constructibility.
(∃Q)(∀X)X ∈ L(Q), where L(Q) denotes the smallest system of classes con-
taining Q,FN and all sets which is closed under the Morse’s scheme of existence of
classes and in which well-orderings are absolute.
These schemes are studied in [S 1985], where it is also proved that the axiom of
constructibility implies (in (TC)+(A6)) all three schemes of choice. There is also
constructed an interpretation of AST+(Q) in AST.
For some of the results, we need to develop the technique of forcing with uncod-
able systems of conditions. In these cases we will use systems of classes and stronger
theories than those listed before. Systems of classes will be denoted by X ,D, E ,P ,
their relation to classes is the same as the relation of classes to sets. TC (resp. AST)
denotes the theory TC (resp. AST) extended by the axiom of extensionality for the
systems of classes and the Morse’s scheme of existence of the systems of classes for
formulas with variables for the systems of classes; thus even in the formulas defining
classes we may quantify systems of classes and use them as parameters. We will
need also the following modification of (Q) : (Q) : (∃Q)(∀X )X ∈ L(Q), where L(Q)
is the smallest collection of classes and systems of classes containing Q,FN and all
sets which is closed under Morse’s scheme and in which well-orderings are absolute
(for a detailed analysis of the higher order constructible processes see [S 1991]).
Note that L(Q) contains all sets, but only some classes and only these selected
classes are elements of systems in L(Q).
The metamathematical strength of these extensions will be studied in the Sec-
tion 3. Here we only note that (Q) need not imply (Q), but it implies all its
important consequences, as e.g. all schemes of choice.
All theorems are proved in the theory TC and its extension, or in the theory TC
and its extensions, if we work with an uncodable system of conditions.
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2. Forcing.
We will suppose that the ordering of the system of condition is given by inclusion.
But even in this case, we may work with a class of conditions with some other
ordering ≤. We may code conditions of such a system by an isomorphic codable
system of classes ordered by ⊆.
In the first part of this section, we give basic definitions and lemmas on the
relation of forcing. In the rest of the section, we will study under what assumptions
the axioms of AST hold in the extension. The most important result is that the
axiom of prolongation holds in the generic extension, if and only if the system of
conditions is closed under countable monotonous intersections. This restricts our
choice of systems of conditions for the concrete proofs.
Notation. (i) By the letters π, ̺, σ, we denote variables for conditions (see Defi-
nition 2.1).
(ii) The formula (∀ ∃ ̺ ⊆ π)ϕ(̺) is a contraction for (∀σ ⊆ π)(∃ ̺ ⊆ σ)ϕ(̺) (i.e. ϕ
holds almost everywhere under π).
Definition 2.1. A system of conditions P is a system of subclasses of a class P
such that P ∈ P and (∀π ∈ P)(∀x ∈ π)¬(∀ ∃σ ⊆ π)(x /∈ σ).
Remark. The last condition says that all elements of any condition are in some
sense substantial; if, in any system, we delete all not substantial elements of all
conditions, then we get an isomorphic system such that this requirement holds.
Definition 2.2. (i) We say that a system D is a name, if D ⊆ V ×P . The letters
D, E denote variables for names.
(ii) X̌ =df X × P ,
(iii) Γ =df {〈x, π〉; (∀ ̺ ⊆ π)(x ∈ ̺)},
(iv) R =df {D;D ⊆ V × P},
(v) R0 =df {X̌;X ⊆ V }.
Remarks. X̌ is a name of the class X , Γ is a name of the generic class, R is the
collection of all names and R0 is the collection of the names of all classes of the
ground model.
By collection of names, we always mean some collection given by a predicate
(otherwise it would not be a legal object in our theory). But we use for them the
set-theoretical notation, since it is more convenient.
Definition 2.3. Given a system of conditions P and a collection of names G ⊇ R0,
we define the relation
π[P ,G]  ϕ(x1, . . . , xk,D1, . . . ,Dm)
for ϕ ∈ FL,D1, . . . ,Dm ∈ G by induction on the length of ϕ:
(a) π  x1 ∈ x2 ⇔df x1 ∈ x2,
π  x ∈ D ⇔df (∀ ∃ ̺ ⊆ π)(x ∈ D
′′{̺}),
π  D1 ∈ D2 ⇔df π  (∃x)(x = D1& x ∈ D2),
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(b) π  ¬ϕ⇔df (∀ ̺ ⊆ π)¬(̺  ψ),
(c) π  ϕ&ψ ⇔df π  ϕ& π  ψ,
(d) π  (∀x)ϕ(x)⇔df (∀x)(π  ϕ(x)),
(e) π  (∀D)(ϕ(D)⇔df (∀D ∈ G)(π  ϕ(D)),
(f) π  x1 = x2 ⇔df x1 = x2,
π  x = D ⇔df π  (∀ y)(y ∈ x⇔ y ∈ D),
π  D1 = D2 ⇔df π  (∀ y)(y ∈ D1 ⇔ y ∈ D2).
Notation. We write only π[G]  ϕ or π  ϕ instead of π[P ,G]  ϕ, if it cannot
lead to any misunderstanding.
Remarks. In a general case, we can speak about P and G only in the theory TC.
But if the system P is codable, we can code the names by classes and use the P
and G even in the theory TC. In the corresponding theory, we may use the relation
 in the definitions of classes. In the sequel, we will work in the theory TC or in
its extension, but if the system P is codable, then all proofs can be done in the
corresponding extension of the theory TC.
The forcing with R corresponds to the construction of the generic extension,
while the forcing with some symmetric collection G (see Definition 2.8) corresponds
to the construction of some symmetric extension.
We leave next four lemmas without proofs, because all of them are only simple
calculations. They give us some rules for counting with .
Lemma 2.4. The following is equivalent:
(i) π  ϕ,
(ii) (∀ ̺ ⊆ π)(̺  ϕ),
(iii) (∀ ∃ ̺ ⊆ π)(̺  ϕ).
Lemma 2.5.
(i) π  ϕ ∨ ψ ⇔ (∀ ∃ ̺ ⊆ π)(̺  ϕ ∨ ̺  ψ),
(ii) π  ϕ⇒ ψ ⇔ (∀ ̺ ⊆ π)(̺  ϕ⇒ (∃σ ⊆ ̺)(σ  ψ)),
π  ϕ⇒ ψ ⇔ (∀ ̺ ⊆ π)(̺  ϕ⇒ ̺  ψ),
(iii) π  ϕ⇔ ψ ⇔ (∀ ̺ ⊆ π)(̺  ϕ⇔ ̺  ψ),
(iv) π  (∃x)ϕ(x)⇔ (∀ ∃ ̺ ⊆ π)(∃x)(̺  ϕ(x)),
π  (∃D)ϕ(D)⇔ (∀ ∃ ̺ ⊆ π)(∃D ∈ G)(̺  ϕ(D)).
Lemma 2.6. Let Γ ∈ G. Then
(i) π  x ∈ Γ⇔ (∀ ̺ ⊆ π)(x ∈ ̺),
(ii) π  x /∈ Γ⇔ x /∈ π.
Lemma 2.7.
(i) π[R0]  ϕ(X̌1, . . . , X̌m))⇔ ϕ(X1, . . . , Xm).
(ii) Let ϕ be a normal formula, D1, . . . ,Dm ∈ G1 ∩ G2. Then
(π[G1]  ϕ(D1, . . . ,Dm))⇔ (π[G2]  ϕ(D1, . . . ,Dm)).
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(iii) Let ϕ be a normal formula, G1 ⊆ G2. Then
(π[G1]  (∃D1) . . . (∃Dm)ϕ(D1, . . . ,Dm))⇒
⇒ (π[G2]  (∃D1) . . . (∃Dm)ϕ(D1, . . . ,Dm)).
(iv) Let ϕ be a normal formula and let ϕ(X) holds. Then (∀π)(π[G]  ϕ(X̌)).
In the next part, we are going to prove that under suitable assumptions the
axioms of AST hold in the extension.
Definition 2.8. A collection of names G is symmetric, iff
(∀ϕ ∈ FL)(∀D1, . . . ,Dm ∈ G)({〈x, π〉; (π  ϕ(x,D1, . . . ,Dm))} ∈ G).
Observation. The collections R and R0 are symmetric.
In the sequel, we suppose that G is a symmetric collection of names. This ensures
that in the extension the Morse’s scheme holds.
Theorem 2.9.
(i) P |= TC.
(ii) If (A4) holds, then P  (A4).
(iii) If (A8) holds, then P  (A8).
Proof: P  A1 follows from Definition 2.3 (f).
P  A3, (A4), (A8) follows from (A3), (A4), (A8) and Lemma 2.7 (iv).
P  (A2). The proof is similar to the classical proof of the scheme of comprehension
in generic extensions. Let ϕ ∈ FL,D1, . . . ,Dm ∈ G. Let
E = {〈x, π〉;π  ϕ(x,D1, . . . ,Dm)}.
By Definition 2.8, we have E ∈ G. It is easy to verify that P  (x ∈ E ⇔
ϕ(x,D1, . . . ,Dm)) and so P  (A2). 
The next lemma says that well-orderings, finite sets and FN are preserved.
Lemma 2.10.
(i) We(R)⇔ P We(Ř).
(ii) Fin(X)⇔ P  Fin(X̌).
(iii) P  FN = FŇ.
Proof: (i) ⇐ is trivial.
⇒: Let We(R) and let D and π be such that π  D 6= ∅. Let y be the R-minimum
of the class {y; (∃ ̺ ⊆ π)(̺  y ∈ D)} which is nonempty; let ̺ ⊆ π be such that
̺  y ∈ D. It follows that
̺ ′′ is the Ř-minimum of D′′.
We have proved P We(Ř).
(ii) and (iii) are simple consequences. 
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Theorem 2.11 (AST–(A5)). P  AST–(A5).
Proof: Let R be a well-ordering of V of the type Ω.
P  (A6) follows directly from the Lemma 2.10 (i).
P  (A7). From the Lemma 2.10 (i), it follows that P We(V̌ , Ř). Because P 
TC, we can prove basic theorems on well-orderings, and because P  FN = FŇ, we
have
P  Ř is of the type Ω.
P  (A7) is an easy consequence. 
Till now we did not study the axiom of prolongation. This axiom does not hold
in all cases. Lemma 2.12 says that it holds, iff there are no new countable classes
in the extension. Lemma 2.13 says that this can be achieved, if the system P
is closed under countable monotonous intersections. The converse also holds for
generic extensions, but for symmetric extensions, this condition is only sufficient,
not necessary.
Lemma 2.12 (TC+(A5)).
π  (A5)⇔ (∀D ∈ G)((π  Fnc(D)& dom (D) = FN)⇒
⇒ (∀ ∃ ̺ ⊆ π)(∃X)̺  X̌ = D).
Proof: ⇒: Let π  Fnc(D)& dom(D) = FN. By π  (A5), we have π 
(∃ f)(D ⊆ f), thus (∀ ∃ ̺ ⊆ π)(∃ f)(̺  D ⊆ f) and it is enough to takeX = f ↾ FN.
⇐: Let ̺ ⊆ π, ̺  Fnc(D)& dom(D) = FN. By the assumption, we have (∀ ∃σ ⊆
̺)(∃X)(σ  X̌ = D). Let us take σ ⊆ ̺ and X such that σ  X̌ = D. Thus σ 
Fnc(X̌)& dom (X̌) = FN and by Lemma 2.7 we have Fnc(X)& dom (X) = FN.
From (A5) we have f such that X ⊆ f , by Lemma 2.7 it holds that σ  (∃ f)D ⊆ f .
We proved that
(∀ ̺ ⊆ π)((̺  Fnc(D)& dom(D) = FN)⇒ (∃σ ⊆ ̺)(σ  (∃ f)(D ⊆ f)))
and by Lemma 2.5 (ii) π  (A5). 
Lemma 2.13 (AST+ (SDC)). Let P be closed under countable monotonous
intersections. Then P  (A5).
Proof: We are going to prove the condition from Lemma 2.12. Let D be such that
π  Fnc(D)& dom(D) = FN, ̺ ⊆ π. Now it is possible to construct a sequence of
conditions ̺ = σ0 ⊇ σ1 ⊇ · · · ⊇ σn ⊇ . . . such that
(∀n)(∃ !x)(σn+1  〈x, n〉 ∈ D).
By (SDC) and the assumption, the class σ =
⋂
{σn;n ∈ FN} is a condition, we
have
(∀n)(∃ !x)(σ  〈x, n〉 ∈ D).
Let X = {〈x, n〉;σ  〈x, n〉 ∈ D}. We have σ  X̌ = D and by Lemma 2.12 π 
(A5). 
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Remark. If P is codable, it is enough to use the axiom of dependent choices instead
of (SDC).
The next theorem summarizes the results of this paragraph:
Theorem 2.14 (AST + (SDC)). Let the system of conditions P be closed under
countable monotonous intersections. Then P  AST.
3. Constructibility, generic extensions.
In this section, we have concentrated all model-theoretical results.
At first, we are going to prove two metatheorems on the relative consistency of
theories containing (Q). We use the technique of constructive processes in higher
order arithmetic, see [S 1991].
Metatheorem 3.1. TC+We(N,≤) + (A8) + (Q) is consistent relatively to A3.
Demonstration: Let us construct an interpretation using the constructive pro-
cess. We start from hereditary finite sets HF and use the interpretation corre-
sponding to L(∅) (i.e. we add all constructible subsets of HF as classes and all
constructible subclasses of them as systems of classes). This is an interpretation of
the theory TC +We(N,≤) + (A8) + (∀X )X ∈ L(∅). 
Metatheorem 3.2. AST+ (Q) is consistent relatively to A4.
Demonstration: First, we use the interpretation L given by the higher order
constructive process, which interprets schemes of choice. Now we take (under L) the
ultraproduct model N of AST, i.e. sets are all sets in the ultraproduct U = HFV /Z,
where Z is some nontrivial ultrafilter on natural numbers, and classes are all subsets
of U , for details see [S 1982] (note that from the validity of schemes of choice
and continuum hypothesis under L we get the axioms of choice and cardinalities
in N). Let Q be some well-ordering of VN of the type Ω (in the sense of N). Now
we take the interpretation corresponding to the constructive process L(Q). This
interpretation composed with L gives an interpretation of AST + (Q). 
The next part covers model-theoretical aspects of forcing. It is very close to the
classical case, so we omit the proofs. Note that our definition of a generic class is
a little different from the classical case. We define it not as a filter of conditions,
but as its intersection—this ensures that it is still a class.
Let M be a countable model of TC, let P and G be given in M.
Definition 3.3. (i) G is a generic class, if it is an intersection of a generic filter
on the system of condition (i.e. of a filter F ⊆ P such that every dense subsystem
R ⊆ P ,R ∈ M has a nonempty intersection with F).
(ii) Let D ∈ G. We define DG = {x; (∃π ⊇ G)π  x ∈ D}.
(iii) M[G,G] = {DG;D ∈ G}.
As in the classical case, we can prove the existence of a generic class for any
countable M.
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Metatheorem 3.4. Let D1, . . . ,Dm ∈ G. Then
(i) π  ϕ(x,D1, . . . ,Dm), iff for all generic classesG ⊆ π there holdsM[G,G] |=
ϕ(x, (D1)G, . . . , (Dm)G).
(ii) Let G be a generic class. Then
M[G,G] |= ϕ(x,D1, . . . ,Dm)⇔ (∃π ⊇ G)(π |= ϕ(x, (D1)G, . . . , (Dm)G)).
Now we are going to study the systems L(X). We reformulate the absoluteness
of L in the language of forcing, which will be useful in the Section 4. Then we prove
that in the case of a codable system of conditions, the generic extension satisfies the
axiom of constructibility. For an uncodable system of conditions, the situation with
constructibility is more complicated. We cannot ensure that we start in a model
which satisfies (Q). But even so we can prove that the model M (restricted to
classes) is definable in M[G, G], if (Q) holds in M.
Lemma 3.5. Let D ∈ G and E ∈ R. Then
π[R]  E ∈ L(D)⇔ (∀ ∃ ̺ ⊆ π)(∃ E0 ∈ G)(̺[R]  E = E0& ̺[G]  E0 ∈ L(D)).
Proof: We will prove that the assertion holds in any countable model of TC—
this implies that it is provable in TC. Let M be any countable model of TC. By
Metatheorem 3.4, the assertion of the lemma in M is a consequence of:
For all G generic, D ∈ M[G,G] and E ∈ M[G,R]
M[G,R] |= E ∈ L(D)⇔ (E ∈ M[G,G] &M[G,G] |= E ∈ L(D)).
But this is true for any M, since M[G,G] is closed under Morse’s scheme and L is
absolute (because sets, ∈ and well-orderings are absolute in the models in question).

Metatheorem 3.6. Let M |= TC+(Q), let P be codable. Then M[G,R] |=
TC+(Q), namely M[G,R] |= (∀X)X ∈ L(〈Q,G〉), where Q is such that M |=
(∀X)X ∈ L(Q).
Proof: Each element of M[G,R] is definable from G and some D ∈ M = L(Q),
thus M[G,R] = L(〈Q,G〉). 
Corollary (TC+(Q)). Let P be codable, let G = R. Then P  (Q).
Metatheorem 3.7. LetM |= TC+(Q), Let G generic be given. Then there exists
a formula Φ(X) in the language of TC such that X ∈ M, iff M[G,G] |= Φ(X).
Proof: Let us fix Q such thatM |= (∀X )X ∈ L(Q) and let us study the construc-
tive process L(Q) inM. By the standard argument (used in the proof of the contin-
uum hypothesis in classical L), each class is added at some codable step of this pro-
cess. But each such fragment of the process can be coded by some class constructible
without mentioning system of classes, and thus M |= (∀X)(∃R)(We(R)&X ∈
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L(R,Q)) (where L(R,Q) denotes the system of all classes constructed up to the
step R of the constructive process starting from Q).
Because the systems L(R,Q) are absolute and depend only on the type of the
ordering R, it is now sufficient to define inM[G,G] the system of all well-orderings
isomorphic to some well-ordering in M. We distinguish two cases.
(A) Suppose that inM[G,G] there are no well-orderings longer than inM. Then
we have
X ∈ M iff M[G,G] |= (∃R)(We(R)&X ∈ L(R,Q))
and we are done.
(B) Let S be a well-ordering in M[G,G] such that each of its segments except
for S itself is isomorphic to some well-ordering in M. S must be limit, hence
L(S,Q) =
⋃
{L(R,Q);R ∈ M& We(R)} and
X ∈ M iff M[G,G] |= X ∈ L(S,Q).

The last theorem of this section characterizes metamathematical consequences
of forcing. It states the model-theoretical consequence of forcing, the relative con-
sistency of corresponding theories easily follows.
Metatheorem 3.8. Let T, S but such theories that for some P ,G and π ∈ P there
holds T ⊢ (π  S), letM be a countable model of T . Then there exists a countable
model N ⊇ M such that sets and the relation of ∈ are absolute relatively toM and
N |= S.
Proof: As in the classical case, we can find a G generic such that G ⊆ π. Now
take N =M[G,G] and use Metatheorem 3.4. 
4. Iterated forcing.
In this paragraph, we are going to study symmetric extensions of a special type—
extensions given as a union of generic extensions with the system of conditions PZ
over an ideal of sets A, where PZ is the cartesian power of P to Z. We will show
that this extension can be defined as a symmetric extension.
We will study the system L(X) carefully. We will show that these extensions do
not satisfy the axiom of constructibility (except for the case of the trivial systemA—
in this case, the extension is a generic extension and the axiom of constructibility
does hold at least in the case P codable). Then we will show that in some cases it
is possible to define the smallest extension (from our system) which includes a new
class.
Let A be a codable system such that for X,Y ∈ A there exists Z ∈ A such that
X ∪ Y ⊆ Z. Let us denote A =
⋃
A. Let Z ∈ A.
Definition 4.1.
(i) PZ =df {π ⊆ P × Z; (∀ a ∈ Z)(π
′′{a} ∈ P)}.
(ii) π/Z =df π ∪ (P × (A \ Z)).
(iii) PA =df {π/Z;Z ∈ A, π ∈ PZ}
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(π/Z has two meanings: if π ∈ PZ , then π/Z is its image in PA (↾ Z is in this case
the inverse operation to /Z); if π ∈ PA, then π/Z is the greatest condition ̺ such
that ̺ ↾ Z ⊆ π).
Observation. (i) The system PZ is closed under countable monotonous intersec-
tions, iff the system P is closed under countable monotonous intersections.
(ii) If the system P is a system of conditions (in sense of Definition 2.1), then
also the systems PZ and PA are systems of conditions.
Both the maximal conditions in PZ and PA are denoted by P . The collections
R for the systems PZ and PA are denoted by RZ and RA.
Now we will define the collections GZ ⊆ RA such that forcing with PA and GZ
is equivalent to forcing with PZ and RZ . The union of these collections will be the
main object of our interest.
Definition 4.2. Let us define the collections GZ ,GA ⊆ RA:
(i) GZ =df {D ∈ RA; (∀π ∈ PA)(D
′′{π} = D′′{π/Z})} (i.e. D depends only
on the part of π over Z),
(ii) GA =df
⋃
{GZ ;Z ∈ A}.
Observation. (∀T ∈ A)(T ⊆ Z ⇒ GT ⊆ GZ).
Notation. For each nameD ∈ RZ there exists a unique corresponding name inGZ ;
we will not distinguish these names. Thus ΓZ denotes the name Γ for the collection
RZ and the unique corresponding name from GZ as well.
By an easy induction on the length of the formula ϕ, we can prove the fol-
lowing lemma, which formulates the equivalence between forcing with [PA,GZ ]
and [PZ ,RZ ]. The corollary summarizes the results from the paragraphs 2 and 3
for GZ .
Lemma 4.3. Let ϕ ∈ FL,D1, . . . ,Dm ∈ GZ , π ∈ PA. Then
π[PA,GZ ]  ϕ(x1, . . . , xk,D1, . . . ,Dm)⇔
⇔ π ↾ Z[PZ ,RZ ]  ϕ(x1, . . . , xk,D1, . . . ,Dm).
Corollary.
(i) GZ is a symmetric collection of names.
(ii) P [GZ ]  TC.
(iii) Let the system P be closed under countable monotonous intersections. Then
AST + (SDC) ⊢ P [GZ ]  AST.
(iv) Let P be codable. Then TC+(Q) ⊢ P [GZ ]  TC+(Q).
The symbol  in the rest of this paragraph means [PA,GA] . We are going to
study this forcing. Our first goal is to prove that GA is a symmetric collection of




(i) F is an automorphism of the system P , if F is a one to one map from P
onto P and there holds
̺ ⊆ π ⇔ F(̺) ⊆ F(π).
(ii) F is symmetric automorphism of the system PA, if F is an automorphism
of PA and
(∀Z ∈ A)(∃Y ∈ A)(Z ⊆ Y &F is an automorphism of PY ).
(iii) Let F be an automorphism of P . Let D ∈ R. We define the name F(D) ∈ R
by
〈x, π〉 ∈ F(D)⇔df 〈x,F
−1(π)〉 ∈ D.
Following two simple lemmas assert that the extension of the automorphism F
on names is well-defined and that it has a good relation to the forcing.
Lemma 4.5. (i) Let F be an automorphism of P . Then F is one to one map
from R onto R.
(ii) Let F be a symmetric automorphism of PA. Then F is a one to one map
from GA onto GA.
Lemma 4.6. Let ϕ ∈ FL,D1, . . . ,Dm ∈ GA. Let F be a symmetric automorphism
of PA. Then
π  ϕ(x1, . . . , xk,D1, . . . ,Dm)⇔
⇔ F(π)  ϕ(x1, . . . , xk,F(D1), . . . ,F(Dm)).
For the proof that GA is a symmetric collection of names, we need some concrete
automorphisms. Let G be a permutation of A such that (∃T ∈ A)(G ↾ (A \ T ) =
Id ↾ (A \ T )). Let us denote




(i.e. F rotates the components of π by the permutation G). Then the map FG is
a symmetric automorphism of PA.
Theorem 4.7 (TC + (A6)). GA is a symmetric collection of names.
Proof: In the theory TC + (A6) it is possible to define cardinalities of classes and
these will be well-ordered. Thus we may fix T ∈ A such that
(∀Y ∈ A, Y ⊇ T )(∃U ∈ A)(Y ⊆ U &Y \ T 4 U \ Y )
(if for some Y this does not hold, we may take it as the next candidate on T , but
due to the well-ordering of cardinalities, this process must stop after a finite number
of steps).
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Let ϕ ∈ FL,D1, . . . ,Dm ∈ GA. Let us take Z ∈ A such that D1, . . . ,Dm ∈ GZ
and T ⊆ Z. We need to prove that
π  ϕ(x,D1, . . . ,Dm)⇔ π/Z  ϕ(x,D1, . . . ,Dm).
⇐ is trivial.
⇒: Let ̺ ⊆ π/Z. We will find σ ⊆ ̺ such that
σ  ϕ(x,D1, . . . ,Dm).
Let us take Y ∈ A such that Z ⊆ Y and ̺ ∈ PY . By the definition of T there exists
U ∈ A such that Y \ Z 4 Y \ T 4 U \ Y . Let H be one to one map of Y \ Z into
U \ Y . Let G be as follows:
G = H ∪H−1 ∪ Id ↾ (A \ dom (H ∪H−1)).
Trivially G ↾ Z = Id ↾ Z and G ↾ (A \ U) = Id ↾ (A \ U). Let σ = ̺ ∩ FG(π). We
will verify that σ ∈ PU :
If a ∈ Z, then ̺′′{a} ⊆ π′′{a} = (FG(π))
′′{a}, thus σ′′{a} = ̺′′{a}.
If a ∈ Y \ Z, then (FG(π))
′′{a} = P , thus σ′′{a} = ̺′′{a}.
If a ∈ A \ Y , then ̺′′{a} = P , thus σ′′{a} = (FG(π))
′′{a}.
FG is a symmetric automorphism of PA. Because FG ↾ PZ = Id, we have
FG(D1) = D1, . . . ,FG(Dm) = Dm.
By Lemma 4.6 FG(π)  ϕ(x,D1, . . . ,Dm), and thus σ  ϕ(x,D1, . . . ,Dm). 
The following theorem summarizes the results from the paragraph 2 for the
forcing with PA and GA.
Observation. Let Φ be a normal formula. Then
π  (∃D)Φ(D)⇔ (∀ ∃ ̺ ⊆ π)(∃U ∈ A)(̺[GU ]  (∃D)Φ(D)).
Theorem 4.8.
(i) P  TC.
(ii) Let P be closed under countable monotonous intersections. Then AST ⊢
P  AST.
Proof: Nontrivial is only the proof of P  (A5). This follows by the observation
from the fact that ¬ (A5) is of the form (∃X)ϕ(X), (ϕ is a normal formula with
the parameter FN) and from P [GZ ]  (A5). 
Now we are going to study the questions connected with the systems L(X).
Lemma 4.9 (TC). Let D, E ∈ GZ . Then π  E ∈ L(D)⇔ π/Z[GZ ]  E ∈ L(D).
Proof: As in Lemma 3.5. 
In the next theorem, we prove that the axiom of the constructibility does not
hold, if both P and A are nontrivial (i.e. P is atomless and A /∈ A).
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Theorem 4.10 (TC + (A6)). Let (∀π ∈ P)(∃ ̺)(̺ ⊂ σ) and x /∈ Z, let D ∈ GZ .
Then P  Γ{x} /∈ L(D).
Proof: By contradiction. In the opposite case, by Lemma 3.5 and Lemma 4.9
there must exists π and E ∈ GZ such that
π  E = Γ{x} .
Let us take ̺ ⊂ π′′{x} from the assumption of the theorem, a ∈ π′′{x} \ ̺, the
conditions ̺1 and π1 such that







′′{y} if y 6= x.
By Lemma 2.6, we have
̺1  〈a, x〉 /∈ Γ{x} ,¬(π1  〈a, x〉 /∈ Γ{x}).
Since E ∈ GZ , we have by the definition of GZ
̺1  〈a, x〉 /∈ E ⇔ π1  〈a, x〉 /∈ E ,
a contradiction with π  E = Γ{x}. 
Corollary. In addition, let A /∈ A. Then P  (∀D)(∃ E)(E /∈ L(D)).
Now we will show that (under some assumptions) it is possible to define the least
Z such that in GZ we can define a class equal to D.
Notation. ̺ =a σ ⇔ (∀x 6= a)(̺′′{x} = σ′′{x}).
Definition 4.11. Let D ∈ GA .
rank (D) =df {〈a, π〉; (∃x)(∃σ1, σ2 ⊆ π)(σ1 =a σ2& σ1  x ∈ D& σ2  x /∈ D)}.
Observation. Let D ∈ GZ . Then rank (D) ∈ GZ and P  rank (D) ⊆ Ž.
Theorem 4.12 (TC + (Q)). Let Z be finite, D ∈ GZ , T ⊆ Z, let π  rank (D) =
Ť . Then (∀ ∃ ̺ ⊆ π)(∃ E ∈ GT )(̺  D = E).
Because of finiteness of Z, it is enough to find, for a given y ∈ Z \T , some ̺ ⊆ π
and E ∈ GZ\{y} such that ̺  D = E . Let y ∈ Z \ T . Then
π  y /∈ rank (D)
and thus there exists ̺ ⊆ π such that
(∀x)(∀ σ1, σ2 ⊆ ̺)(σ1 =y σ2 ⇒ ¬(σ1  x ∈ D& σ2  x /∈ D)).
Let us take
E = {〈x, σ〉; (∃σ1 ⊆ ̺)(σ1 =y σ& σ1  x ∈ D)}.
Trivially E ∈ GZ\{y} . We want to prove that ̺  E = D. We will show that for
σ ⊆ ̺ there holds 〈x, σ〉 ∈ E ⇔ σ  x ∈ D:
⇐ is trivial.
⇒: We have (∃σ1 ⊆ ̺)(σ1 =y σ& σ1  x ∈ D). By assumption on ̺, we have
(∀σ2 ⊆ σ)¬(σ2  x /∈ D) and thus (∀ ∃σ2 ⊆ σ)(σ2  x ∈ D) and σ  x ∈ D. 
Forcing in the alternative set theory I 337
References
[S 1979] Sochor A., Metamathematics of the Alternative set theory I, Comment. Math. Univ. Car-
olinae 20 (1979), 697–722.
[S 1982] Sochor A., Metamathematics of the Alternative set theory II, Comment. Math. Univ.
Carolinae 23 (1982), 55–79.
[S 1985] Sochor A., Constructibility and shiftings of view, Comment. Math. Univ. Carolinae 26
(1985), 477–498.
[S 1991] Sochor A., Scheme of choice in higher order arithmetics, to appear.
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